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Private property plays two opposing ro les in stori es about the 
environment. In the story favored by most env ironmentali sts, private 
property is the bad guy.1 It balkanizes an intercon nected ecosystem 
into artificial units of ind ividual ownership. Owners of these finite 
pa rce ls have liule incent ive to invest in ecosystem resources and 
every incentive to dump polluting wastes onto other parcels. Only by 
relocating control over natural resources in some central authority like 
the federal governmen t, can we make integrated decisions designed to 
preserve the hea lth of the entire ecosystem. For these trad itional 
environ menta lists, private property is the problem; public contro l is 
the solution. 
There is a counter story, told by the proponent s of what is 
sometimes call ed free market en vironmentali sm.2 [n thi s stOly. private 
property is the good guy. Environmen tal degradation is a prob lem 
because of incomplete property rights. If all resources were privately 
owned. then no one would be able to impose ex ternal it ies 011 anyone 
else; potentia l poll uters would have to purchase the righ t to pollute 
first. Similarly, if all resources- including habitats of endangered 
species and other ecologically sensit ive resou rces- werc privately 
owned, then owncrs would have incen tives to in vest in the 
preservation of these resources, and would use their ingenuity to get 
persons who care about envi ronmental protection to pay fo r il. For 
free market environ mentalisls, public control of resources is the 
problem; pri vate property is the solution. 
Both sides in this debate are on ly half right. The traditional 
environmentali sts are closer to the mark in thei r diagnosis of the 
prob lem. Property rights are always and inevitably incomplete, as it is 
costly to set up and en force any system of pri vate property . Beca use 
• Charles Keller Beckman I'rofcssorof Law. Colurnbia UniversilY. 
I. See. e,g .. Eric T. Frcyfog1c. Ownership and Ecology . 43 CASE W. RES. L. RI:\', 1269. 
1275· 77. 1284- 85 ( 1993). 
2. See, e.g.. TI:RRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. L EAl.. FREE M ARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991). 
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property rights are incomplete, owners of resources that are subject 10 
private ownership-such as parccJs of land devoted 10 productive 
uses- will always have incentives to disregard the costs they impose 
on common resources that arc not subject to private ownership. 
Sometimes creating new types of property rights can help the 
si tuation ; more often, however, Ihe only cost-effective solution to 
these sorts of spillovers is government rcgu]a1ion. 
On the olher hand. the free market environmentalists arc closer to 
the mark in deviSing a solution to the problem. Missing from the 
traditional account is any credible theory of how we can generate 
collective action to protect sensitive ecosystem resources. Bursts of 
co llective altruism do happen. but they are difficult to sustain. 
Witness the history of socialism, or. morc pcrtinently thc history of 
environ mentali sm.] What is needed is an institutional arrangement 
that generates private incentives supporting collective action that will 
protect the environment. The best such arrangement is the widespread 
privatc ownership of land. In thi s sense, the free market 
environmcnta lists are closer to the mark in their prescription of a cure 
than are the traditional environmentalists. with thcir ca ll for a bigger 
government. 
I. 
Casual cmpiricism strongly suggests that private property is good 
fo r the environment. Eastern Europe in the 1980s offered a kind of 
natural ex periment about the effects of different property rcgimes.~ 
An iron curtain ran through Eastcrn Europe from the Baltic to the 
Mediterranean. West of the line , real property was predominately 
subject to private ownership. East o f the line, real property was 
owned by the state. The results were plain for all to see: while towns 
and villages on the west sidc were typically neat and elean. with well-
scrubbed streets and colorful boxes of nowers in the windows, towns 
and vi ll agcs on the east side were drab and dirty. with plaster falling 
off the walls and no nowers to be seen anywhere. These pai red 
communities were generally composed of buildings of the same 
vintage and style of construct ion and were populated by families 
3. SCI' RICHARD J. LAZARUS. TilE I>'IAKING OF ENVIRON~IENTAL LAW (2004) 
(dcscribing Ihe gridlock Ihal has descended upon cnvironmenlal law in an em of divided 
govemmenl). 
4. See Jon Thompson. Ea.,., Elirope'I Dark Dmt'/l, NAT'L GEOGRAPIIIC, June 19<)1. a\ 
42-44.52. for a discussion of environmcnlal comlilions in Easlem Europe after Ihe fall of 
eOmmll111sm. 
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having the same ethnic background and cul tural tradi tions. The only 
difference was that for forty years the communit ies in the west had 
bcen under a regime of private property, whi le those in the east had 
been under a regime of collective ownersh ip. 
Clearly, there is some kind of relationship between pri vate property 
and environmen ta l amenities. But what exactly is the causal 
mechanism that leads from private property to increased 
environmental protection? 
Undoubtedly, part of the ex planation has to do with what might be 
cal led the private law incentives created by a system of private 
property. As Harold Demsetz pointed out many years ago, private 
property is a powerful mechanism for internal izing externalities 
through private law.s Private property does this in two ways. Fi rst, 
private property allows one unique owner to capture improvements in 
the quality of the resources that are privately owned. If there were no 
private property in resources, any improvements would be 
experienced mostly as extemal benefits by others, and hence 
improvemen ts would be under-produced. Second, by designating one 
person as the owner of resources, private property makes contracting 
about the use of resources easier- incl uding contracting to reduce 
externalities. If these resources could not be private ly owned, 
contracting about the ir use would be incredibly complicated and 
would almost never take place. 
Without denigrat ing the importance of these private law forces, I 
would stress someth ing else: that widespread ownership of private 
property transfonns public law as we ll as private law. It does so 
through the creation of what might be ca lled the private property 
lobby. This immensely powerful lobby creates a political culture that 
favors the regulation of uses of private property that diminish the 
value of other private property. 
The public law impact of private property may be more significant 
than the private law effect, in tenus of generating significant 
protection fo r the environment. To see this, consider three effects of 
private property stressed by the body of li terature that followed 
Demsetz and his thesis about the private law effects of private 
property.6 I will ca ll these the "wealth effect," the "capitalization 
effect," and the ;'aeeountability effect." [n each case, the impact of 
these effects is weak or ambiguous insofar as it is manifested through 
5. Harold Dcrnsctz. Tml"(ml (J Theory of Property Rights. 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS 
& PROC. 347. 347- 50(1967). 
6. Id. 
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private law incentives and market mechanisms. In contrast, insofar as 
each effect is translated into publ ic law, it has a powerful effect on the 
cnVlfonmcnt. 
A. The Wealth Effect 
Fi rst, consider the "wealth effect." Private property generates 
wcalth.7 One reason for this is that private property creates vastl y 
enhanced incentives for investing in improvements to resources . 
Another reason is that private property translates into longer ti me 
horizons in considering investments. A third is that private property 
leads to a much more efficient allocation of resources. In any evenl, 
for a given stock of natural resources, a system in whi ch those 
resources are subject to private ownershi p and control will generate 
more wealth than a system in which such resources are controlled by 
the government or subject to open aceess.s 
Just as private property generates more wealth, additional wealth 
generates more env ironmental protections . The relationshi p is not 
strictly linear. Data gathered by variolls economists suggest that 
increased wealth in socicty is initially associated with a decline in 
environmental quality.9 As gross national product (GN P) per capita 
contin ues to grow, however, the relationship quickly turns around and 
further increases in wealth become associated with increased levels of 
environmental protection activity. Gene Grossman and Alan Kruger, 
two Princeton economists. have estimated that po llution as a 
percentage of GNP increases with economic growth until GN P 
reaches about $5 ,000 per person: 10 from then on, pollution as a 
percentage of GNP steadily decl ines as the economy contin ues to 
groW. 11 Thus. after the initial hump is passed. a contin uously hi gher 
percentage of social resources is dedicated to environmental 
protection. 
Why docs more wealth mean more environmental protection? 
Private incentives may account for some of the phenomenon. As 
people get richer, they devote more resources to cleaning up their own 
7. See. e.g .. HERNANDO DE SOTO. T ilE ~'I YSTERY OF CAPITAL 50-57 (2000) ; Cass R. 
Sunstein. 011 Properly and COlIslilUliOlwlism. 14 CAROOZO L. R EV. 907, 911 - 913 ( 1993). 
8. See Robert C. E1lickson. ProperZI' ill Lalld. 102 YALE L.J. 1315. 1325- 28. 1335-41 
(1993). for cotllparative data on the prodllc t ivity of privately versus collC<:tively-owned 
land. 
9. Sa' GREGG EASTERIJRooK. A M O:-,.tENT ON THE EARTH 31 7- 33 (1995) ; Bl0RN 
LOMBORG, THE SK EPTICAL ENVIRON~ 'ENT "LIST 33 (200 I). 
1 O. EASTER I:IRooK. sllpm note 9. at 33 1. 
11. Id. 
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property, either because they do not like liv ing amidst smoke and 
grime or out of a sense of pride. It is also poss ible that as people get 
richer, they enter into more ex plic it and implicit contracts- Coasean 
bargains l 2- with neighbors in order to curb polluting activities. But 
the wealth effect also creates incentives for private behavior less 
favorable to the environment. As people get richer, waste streams 
grow larger. If the only constraints on individuals are pride and 
private contractual obligations, many will be temptcd to dispose of 
these wastes onto their neighbors' land. Considering only private 
incentives and market mechanisms, the net effect of rising wealth on 
the envi ronment is uncertain. 
But ri sing wealth has another effect: stimulating higher demand fo r 
env ironmental protection through political mechanisms. As people get 
richer, they develop a stronger taste for environmental ameni ties.1l 
This taste translates into a demand for government action to protect 
the environmen t. Additional wealth also makes achievement of this 
regulatory protection morc feas ible. As they get richer, people 
become more willing to have a portion of their wealth taxed to 
support the regulatory and enforcement efforts necessary to sustain a 
program of public env ironmental protection. Thus, the strong 
correlation economists have uncovered between rising wealth and 
declining pollution is due, in large part, to increased regulatory 
activity in wealthy countries. 
B. The Capilalizalion Effect 
A second mechanism link ing private property and the environment 
is the "capitalization effect." Property does not exist in splendid 
isolation from that which surrounds it. Instead, the val ue of property 
is profoundly affected by its environs. 14 A sma ll bungalow in a griny 
industrial district may be worth only a few thousand dollars; the same 
bungalow with a beautiful view of the ocean may be worth a million 
or more. An economist would say that the ugliness or beauty of the 
surroundings is capital ized into the market val ue of the property. All 
things being equa l, a clean, pleasing environment with numerous 
12. Sce R.ll. Coasc. Thc Problem 0/ Sod," COIl. 3 J.L. & ECQN. 1,4- 5.9 (1960) 
(discussing thc possibility of contracts bctwccn property owncrs to optimizc nuisancc-likc 
spillovers). 
13. Scc Ncmat Sh:lfik. Ecollomic Del"eloplllel1l and Enl"irOllllllmlal QualilY: All 
EcoIIOl/U!lrk" AlIllly;,·jI. 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 757 (1994). for some evidence of this 
phenomcnon. 
14. See Abmham Bcll & Gideon Parchomovsky. 0/ PnJPf'l"Iy lind Al1IipnJpeny. 102 
MtCIl. L. R EV. 1.20- 23 (2003). 
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recreational opportunities makes property values go up. A dirty, 
dangerous environment without any parks or other greenery makes 
property values go down. 
The capi tali zation effect, like the wealth effect, creates incentives 
for both private and political action. It undoubtedly creates private 
incentives for owners to improve their own properties, which provides 
external benefits to the ir neighbors. It al so creates incentives to join 
with other neighbors in mutual efforts to enhance the quality of the 
neighborhood. This can take a number of fanns. from volunteering to 
pick up litter in the park to entering into fannal covenants to assure 
that property is nOl used in ways that might cause a decline in 
property va lues. Neverthe less, there are limits to how far the 
capital ization cffect ean drive thesc sorts or c rforts. Each property 
owner has an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others who 
participate in the litter patrol or enter into burdensome covenants. 
Thus, the impact of thc capital ization cffcct on privatc cfforts to 
enhance the environment is likely to be weak. 
However, thc capitalization effect also creates an incentive for 
property owners to become invo lved in the political process. 
Professor Bi ll Fischel of Dartmou th cans th is the "Homcvoter 
Effect.,,15 Homeowners are the most potent polit ical force in the 
community, Fischcl argues, and they use their power to pressure 
politicians to adopt policies- including pro-environmental ones-that 
win increase property values. Fischel believes that homevoter power 
can be seen most clearly in local politics. as homevoters lobby to keep 
out unwanted land uses like dumping. and demand that developcrs of 
new subdivisions create new parks. State and national environmental 
protection laws prov ide another mcthod for voters to preserve or 
increase property values through legislation. For example, cleaning up 
Lake Michigan enhances property values along the Chicago lake front, 
making such laws attractive to homeowners in that region; stricter air 
pollution laws enhance the value of property in Los Angeles and 
would appeal to wealthy Angelinos. 
C. The Accollntability Effect 
A third effect that private property has on the env ironment can be 
caned the "accountability effect." When resources arc owned by the 
government or held in open acccss commons. no single person is the 
15. W ILLIAM A. FISCHEL. THE Ilo~I r:VOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES 
INfLUENCE LOCAL GOVERN~IENT T AX,\ TlON. SCHOOL FINANCE. AND LAND-USE 
POLICIES (2001). 
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resident manager of any particular group of resources; thus, no one 
can be held accountable for an env ironmental mess . Under a private 
property regime things are very different. Because each patch of 
resources has its own owner, and hence we know whom to blamc 
when bad things start emanating from any particular area . 
The accountabili ty effect undoubtedly provides a small but positive 
boost to private efforts to en hance env ironmental qua lity. Because of 
the accountability effect, shaming can play a role in achieving a 
degree of environmental protection. Members of the community will 
generally know who is a good ne ighbor, environmentally speaking, 
and who is not. Those who are not good neighbors can be critic ized or 
ostracized, and this may cause them to adjust thei r behavior. 16 The 
accountability effcct also creates the precondition for Coasean 
bargains among neighbors that are designed to interna lize 
ex ternalities. There is no way to enter into a contract to limit 
env ironmental harms unti l people know with whom they should 
contract. Parcel ization through private property provides this 
infomlation. Again, however, there are limits as to how much 
env ironmental protection we can achieve through social norms and 
Coasean bargai ns. Undoubted ly, we can make some progress toward 
env ironmental protection efforts, and it is even very likely that we can 
accomplish more than most people would expect. Howevcr, free rider 
problems will limit how far these strategies can go. 
The accountability effect also has a powerful impact on political 
action to protect the environment. If resources arc owned by the 
government or arc held in common, then it is possible to have 
collectivc act ion designed to protcct these resources. Such protection 
takcs the form of directives from upper level bureaucrats to lower 
level bureaucrats. There is a lot of room for sl ippage in such cases, a 
situation which is known as the principal-agent problem. Lowcr level 
bureaucrats may be more interested in pursuing their own agendas 
than in faithfully executing the orders from above. 17 Once we 
introduce private property, however, regulation takes on much more 
bite. Because there is an accountable owner of each parcel , we can 
readily determine who is responsible if pol lution or other 
environmental harms emanate from any particular parcel. The owner 
can be easily pinpointed and subjectcd them to civil or criminal 
[6. See ROflERT C. ELLICKSON. ORDER WITIIOUT L AW: How NEIGHBORS SETILE 
DrSPUTES t84- 85, 230- 36 (199 [). 
17. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN. JR .• BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 36- 37 ( [ 971). 
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sanctions, which could include losing ownership of the property. 
In short, because of the wealth, capitalization, and accountabi lity 
effects, a system of private property provides a modest boost \0 
private law efforts \0 enhance environmental quality. Additionally. 
these th ree effects exert an even morc powerful force on the political 
system in the direction of greater environmental enforcement activity. 
[I. 
The foregoing thes is has important implications for a number of 
important policy questions. For example, it suggests that public 
ownershi p of natural resources may lead to the inev itable degradation 
of these resources. This in turn suggests that the strong presumption 
against further private disposition of the public domain lands- which 
constitutc about thirty percent of the land mass in the United States-
may be misguided from an environmental protection perspective. 
Moreover, this thesis suggests that local regulation may be a more 
powerful fo rce for environmental protection than either state or 
federal regulation. Thus, the strong presumption in favor of increased 
central ized control over resources may be misguided from an 
environmental protection standpoint. Let me tum to two other policy 
implications, which I wi ll consider in somewhat greater detail. 
A. Constitutiollal Shield for Pr;l"(lle Properly? 
The first of these implications concerns the perennial debate over 
how far constitutional protections for private property should shield 
owners from the effects of environmental regulation. We can consider 
two extreme policies here, neither of which would bc very 
satisfactory in terms of their impact on the environment. 
One extreme policy wou ld be to eliminate all constitutional 
protection for private property. This would greatly increase the risks 
of investing in private property, as the government could seize private 
property at any time without paying just compensation. In such a 
world, which has existed in many times and places, economic activity 
would grind 10 a hah. The expeetcd rcturn on investments in property 
and the level of investment would decrease and significant resou rces 
would be diverted to concea ling assets or lobbying the government to 
take someone else's property rather than one's own, furthe r 
depressing economic activity. The wealth effect associated with 
private property would be reduced. as would the capita lization effect. 
Because the government could se ize property without pay ing for it, it 
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is plausible that the percentage of assets owned by the govern ment 
wou ld increase, reducing the accountab ility effect. In all likel ihood, 
the pol icy of denying all constitutional protections for private 
property wou ld be harmful to the environment. 
Now consider the oppos ite policy, one that would provide full 
indemnity to property owners for losses in va lue attributable to 
environmen ta l regulations. Superficia lly considered. this would have 
the opposite effect. Private property wou ld face no risks from adverse 
government action , thereby increasing the wealt h, capitali zation, and 
accountabi lity effects. It might therefo re increase the return on private 
and voluntary efforts to improve the environment . But by making the 
government- and taxpayers- pay for all losses in value assoc iated 
with environmental regulations, the full compensation policy would 
greatly reduce the return on politi cal action seeking 10 protect the 
env ironment. This would al most certainly have a dampening effect on 
env ironmental cleanup efforts. 
To see how thi s might happen, consider the following nu merical 
example focusing on the capitalization effeel. l8 Suppose a brickyard 
that emits smoke and odors operates in a residential neighborhood. 
The pollution depresses the va lue of adjacent land by SI.5 million , 
and causcs $750,000 in additional injuries to morc remotc property 
and persons who work in or pass through the neighborhood. Suppose 
further that the loss in value to the brickyard if it is shut down is $\ 
million. Finally, suppose that the cost to adjacent landowners of 
organizing a politica l campaign to enact an ordina nce lhal would 
close the brickyard is $500,000. If no compensation is required for 
closing the brickyard, then the su rrounding landowners will invest 
$500,000 in securing the ordinance, and wi ll reap a profit of $\ 
million in the rorm of increased land va lues. This will generate a net 
surplus of benefits over costs in the amount of $750,000. 
In contrast, suppose that the brickyard is cntit led to full 
compensation in the amount of $ 1 mi llion, and thai the adjacen t 
landowners are charged a special assessment to pay this 
compensation. On these assumptions, the adjacent landowners will 
have no incentive to lobby ror a shutdown of the brickyard. Such a 
law wi ll result in no change in the capita lized value of the ir property 
- the propcrty owners' net gain from climinating the smoke nuisance 
will be eli mi nated by the new tax assessments. Anticipating this, the 
18. I havc auoplcd lhc cxamplc from Hadachcck v. Scbascian. 239 US. 394. 404-01 
( 19 15). a classic cnkings casco 
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landowners will forgo an y politi cal action to sh ut down the brickyard. 
This will result in inefficient under-regulation, because the other 
affected owners, workers, and passersby wi ll have to cont inue to 
suffer from the pollulion. 19 
The point of thi s example is not to argue that environmental 
regulation is economica lly justified or unjustified-the numbers could 
be manipulated to reach either result. Rather, the point is that 
requiring full indemnificati on for all losses in value caused by 
environmental regulations would result in a reduction in polit ical 
activity to secure such regulations, provided there is any overlap at all 
between the beneficiaries o f the regulation and the persons who must 
pay for the compensation. Since there is reason to believe that 
political action is critical in securing environmental protection, Ihis 
resu lt would be harmfu l to the environment. 
In short, a rule of no compensation for government takings would 
be hannful to the environment because this would depress wealth and 
property values, thereby reducing incenti ves to engage in collective 
action to enhance environmental protection efforts. A rule of full 
indemnification for all losses associated with environmental 
protection regulati ons would also be harn1ful to the environment, 
because it would reduce the return s on collective environmental 
protection efforts. This suggests that the optimal compensation rule is 
one that strikcs a balance between no compensation and full 
compensation. This, of course, is our current system. Property owners 
are compensated for government expropriations of their land, but not, 
except in extreme circumstances, for reductions in land value 
resulting from government regu lations. 20 
B. Eq/l(lli~)' in Distributiol1 of EnvirOl1mental Bene}its? 
The second poli cy impli cati on of this thesis concerns 
environmental justice or, more pungently, environmental racism.21 
The focus here is on the distribution of env ironmental benefits (such 
as parks) and hanns (such as pollution and landfills). Studies have 
indicated that the poor suffer from a surfeit of environmental harms 
19. I assume that becausc of transac tion COSts. there is no possibility of collective action 
by these diffusc bcneficiaries. 
20. The principal cxception is for regulations that eliminate the value of the land. See 
Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003. 1014- J 9 ( 1992). 
21 . See Vicki Been, What 's Fairness Got 10 Do Wilh II? Enl"iwllinen/a/ J/ls/ice and the 
Siting of Locolly Undesirable Land Uses. 78 CORNEl l L. REV. 1001. 1009- 15 (1993); 
Richard J. Lazarus. Pllrsuing '"Em'irall/nell/a! Jlls/ice ": The Distribu/ion,,1 Effects of 
Elldl"OlIlI1ell/(ll PrO/eelion. 87 Nw. U. L. RE V. 787. 796-81 \ (1993). 
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and a deficit of cnvironmental benefits. 22 Researchers have also made 
di sturbing findings that, adjust ing for income, communities with large 
numbers of racial minorities are di sproportionately exposed to 
environmental harms.2] One might argue that this reflects some 
deeply embedded institutional rac ism in the environmental regulatory 
process. 
The thesi s proposed here- that propcrty ownersh ip is a critical 
ingredient in producing politi cal support for cnviron mental 
regu lat ion-suggests an alternative ex planation. Historically there has 
been a significant gap in homc ownership betwccn white and 
nonwhite famil ics, a gap wh ich persists to this day. 24 If members of 
minority groups are less likely to own rcal property at any g iven level 
of income than whi tes, one would expect to find lower levels of 
political acti vism in minority communiti es in support of aggressivc 
environmcntal rcgulation. This reduced level of political activism 
would translate into a di sproportionately high level of env ironmental 
harms and d isproportionately low level of bencfits in minority 
communities. 
The thesis also suggests the direc tion in which a solution to thi s 
disparity might lic. The only pennanent so lut ion to the imbalanced 
di stribution of env ironmental harms and benefits across diffcrcnt 
communit ies is to equalize the level of political clout across 
communit ies. Th is is true without regard to the level of government at 
which thc distribution of hanns and benefits is determined . If hanns 
and benefits are distributed at the national leve l, it is important that 
those in the community opposed to the harms (and in favor of the 
benefits) ha ve access to federal executive officials, legi slati ve 
oversight committees, and courts for judicial review. On the other 
hand, if hanns and benefi ts arc di stributed locally, it is important that 
the community have access to the mayor, city council , zoning board, 
and state courts for judic ial review. This type of sustained pol itical 
pressure is most likely to come from persons whose property va lues 
are most significantly affected by the presence of env ironmental 
harms and benefits in the communi ty. This suggests that the long-Ienn 
solution to problems of environmental justice is to increase the 
incidence of properly ownership within minority communities. 
22. See Lazarus. sup"" notc 21. at 792-93. 
23. See Lazarus. supw note 21. 
24. See. e.g. William J. Collins & Robcn A. Margo. R(lce and Home O""I//:"~'hip: 
1900- J 990. at hup: lfwww.ch.nc!lClioIConfcrcnccsl ASSN Jan_ OOlmargo.shun 1 (last 
visitcd Nov. 16.2004). 
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I l l , CONCLUSION 
Private property creates wealth, capitalizes environmental costs and 
benefi ts into property va lues, and makes owners accountable for the 
environmental hanns they cause. As such, private property creates the 
condi tions for its effective regulation. Karl Marx might say that this is 
evidence of the cultural contradictions of private property; it is not. 
There is no con tradiction- only the need for a delicate balance. White 
private property must be suffic ientl y free of government regu lation 
and taxation in order to represent a major share of household wealth, 
it cannot be overprotec ted to the poi nt that government regulation is 
thwarted. Exactly where to strike the balance wi ll always be 
controversia l. The fact that some kind of balance is necessary in order 
to achieve effective environmental protection should not be. 
